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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell
I.

OBJECTIONS

Previous survey articles have discussed the need for precise objections
to preserve an issue for appeal. Sometimes, however, even the most
precise objection may not be sufficient. In Garner u. Victory Express,
Inc.,' plaintiff objected to defendant's counsel's comment during closing
argument on the lack of any evidence indicating that defendant was
unsafe or careless.' Apparently, defense counsel was referring to the
absence of evidence of prior negligence on the part of defendant's driver.
The trial court overruled this objection? Plaintiff argued that because
he was precluded from proving defendant's negligence by his prior
driving record or from proving the driver's general character for
recklessness in driving, defendant should not be allowed to comment on
the absence of any such evidence. 4
Although plaintiff's argument appears improper, the Georgia Court of
Appeals did not reach this issue. Rather, the court of appeals determined that plaintiff's objection was insufficient because he failed to state
the action he wanted the trial court to take.5 When a party objects to
a question or answer during the course of the examination of a witness,
the relief requested is obvious; the question should not be answered or,

* Partner in the firm of Chambless, Higdon &Carson, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State
University (B.A., 1978); Walter F. George School of Law (J.D. cum laude, 1981). Member,

State Bar of Georgia.
1. 210 Ga. App. 481, 436 S.E.2d 521 (1993),

rev'd, Garner v. Victory Express, Inc., 264

Ga. 171, 442 S.E.2d 455 (1994).
2. 210 Ga. App. at 481, 436 S.E.2d at 521.
3. Id.
4. See Whidby v. Columbine Carrier, Inc., 182 Ga. App. 638, 356 S.E.2d 709 (1987),
overruled, Pender v. Witcher, 194 Ga. App. 72, 389 S.E.2d 560 (1989), rev'd, Witcher v.
Pender, 260 Ga. 240, 392 S.E.2d 6 (1990).

5. 210 Ga. App. at 482, 436 S.E.2d at 522.
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if given, the answer should be stricken.6 In the context of a closing
argument, however, the desired relief is not obvious. Accordingly, the
court of appeals held that requesting the relief desired is incumbent
upon a party objecting to an improper closing argument.7 The relief
requested can be an appropriate instruction to the jury, a rebuke of
counsel, or a mistrial! The court of appeals acknowledged that plaintiff
timely objected and properly stated the grounds for his objection. 9 By
not specifying the desired relief, however, he failed to invoke a reviewable ruling.1" Thus, even though the trial court overruled plaintiff's
objection, plaintiff should have stated the relief he desired. In other
words, plaintiff's counsel should have exacerbated the situation by
futilely requesting specific relief when he saw his objection belittled by
the judge in front of the jury. These requests would have created the
impression that defendant's counsel's argument raised a valid point."
II.

RELEVANCY

A

Relevancy of ExtrinsicAct Evidence
Perhaps the most problematic area of evidence law is extrinsic act
evidence. Extrinsic act evidence provides evidence of conduct on
occasions other than the one at issue. This evidence is extrinsic to the
transaction or incident at issue and, as a general rule, is inadmissible.
Like the rule against hearsay, however, the rule against extrinsic act
evidence is known more for its exceptions rather than its flat prohibitions. Extrinsic act evidence may be admissible for a substantive
purpose. For example, evidence of a prior criminal offense used to
demonstrate motive. Extrinsic act evidence may also be admissible to
impeach or bolster a witness. For example, evidence of a felony
conviction to impeach a witness' character would be admissible. When
analyzing extrinsic act evidence, one must first consider the threshold
question of whether the proffered evidence is actually extrinsic to the act
at issue. Although used more frequently to admit hearsay evidence, the
res gestae doctrine also permits the introduction of evidence that may

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11.

The supreme court, in a decision after the survey period, reversed the court of

appeals and overruled the authority which led to the court of appeals conclusion. Thus,
a mere objection, without requesting specific relief is sufficient to preserve the issue for
appeal. Garner,264 Ga. at 171, 442 S.E.2d at 455.
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seem extrinsic to the act at issue. The admission of evidence under the
res gestae doctrine depends on the relationship between the extrinsic act
and the act at issue. For example, in Touchton v. State, 2 defendant,
who had been convicted of child molestation, claimed that the prosecution improperly placed his character into issue by eliciting testimony
from an acquaintance of the victim.'" The acquaintance, who along
with the victim had posed nude for defendant, testified that defendant
frequently bought them beer.14 The witness' testimony suggested that
defendant's beer purchases provided the incentive for her to pose for
defendant i' 5 The trial court overruled defendant's objection and the
court of appeals affirmed.' 6 The court of appeals ruled that defendant's
acts were part of the res gestae of a similar crime and were admissible
even though they impugned defendant's character. 7
For years, Georgia courts routinely and liberally admitted evidence of
similar, but totally unrelated, transactions in criminal cases. In the past
two Evidence surveys,"8 however, the author discussed two decisions of
the Georgia Supreme Court, Stephens v. State, 9 and Williams v.
State,2" that appear to signal a decided shift in this trend. In Stephens
the supreme court held that the prosecution cannot rely solely on a
certified copy of a prior conviction when seeking to use that conviction
as similar transaction evidence. 2 ' Rather, the prosecution must offer
evidence proving the requisite degree of similarity or connection between
the extrinsic act and the charged offense.2" In Williams the supreme
court, in a dramatic departure from prior practice, held that the
prosecution must prove, prior to trial, three elements before similar
transaction evidence can be admitted.' First, the prosecution must
prove the relevance of the independent transaction to a legitimate
Second, the prosecution must prove that the defendant
issue.'

12. 210 Ga. App. 700, 437 S.E.2d 370 (1993).
13. Id. at 701, 437 S.E.2d at 373.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 701-02, 437 S.E.2d at 373.
17. Id.
18. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 45 MERCER L. REV. 229, 231 (1994); Marc. T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 44 MERCER L. REV. 213, 216-20 (1993) (stating the trial court's failure
to make the threshold admissibility finding required by Williams was harmless error
because the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the Williams requirements).
19. 261 Ga. 467, 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991).
20. 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).
21. 261 Ga. at 468-69, 405 S.E.2d at 485.
22. Id.
23. 261 Ga. at 642, 409 S.E.2d at 651.
24. Id.
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committed the independent offense or act.'
Third, the prosecution
must prove a sufficient connection or similarity between the prior act or
offense and the charged offense.2 The trial court must then make a
specific determination that the prosecution has carried its burden of
proving each of the three elements.2 7 The court of appeals readily
embraced Stephens and Williams and, for the most part, decisions during
the present survey period indicated a continued restriction of the
permissible use of extrinsic act evidence.
In Riddle v. State," defendant contended that the trial court
improperly admitted extrinsic act evidence by failing to hold the pretrial
hearing required by Williams and Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3.29
However, defendant failed to object to the evidence on this basis. The
court of appeals addressed the issue of whether this failure to object
barred defendant from raising this issue on appeal.3 0 In reviewing
Rule 31.3 and Williams, the court of appeals found that the burden of
conducting the required hearing is placed solely on the prosecution and
the trial court.3 ' A defendant has no responsibility to request a
hearing.3 2 Thus, a defendant's failure to object to the admission of
similar transaction evidence on the basis that the hearing was not
conducted does not constitute a waiver of his objection."
Typically in extrinsic act decisions, the evidence consists of prior
crimes against third parties. In Barrettv. State,3 4 however, defendant
contended that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior
difficulties between him and the victim without first conducting the
hearing required by Uniform Superior Court Rules 31.1 and 31.3."
The supreme court took this opportunity to catalog its recent attempts,
such as those in Stephens and Williams, to provide guidance to trial
courts in determining whether to admit similar transaction evidence.36
The court noted that extreme prejudice can result from the admission of

25. Id.

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 208 Ga. App. 8, 430 S.E.2d 153 (1993).
29. Id. at 9-10, 430 S.E.2d at 155; UNIFORM SUPERIOR COURT RULES 31.3(c) (1993).
30. 208 Ga. App. at 9-10, 430 S.E.2d at 155.
31. Id. at 10-11, 430 S.E.2d at 155-56.
32. Id.
33. Compare Morales v. State, 210 Ga. App. 414, 416, 436 S.E.2d 528, 530 (1993)
(stating the trial court's failure to make the threshold admissibility finding required by
Williams was harmless error because the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the Williams
requirements).
34. 263 Ga. 533, 436 S.E.2d 480 (1993).
35. Id. at 533, 436 S.E.2d at 481; UNIFORM SUPERIOR COURT RULES, 31.1, 31.3 (1993).
36. 263 Ga. at 534, 436 S.E.2d at 481-82.
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prior act evidence, and an explanation on analyzing this evidence has
become necessary given the increased use of prior act evidence in
criminal prosecutions.37 Because the cases listed in Barrett involved
prior similar transactions that did not involve the victim, the trial court
concluded that the procedural requirements for the admission of
extrinsic act evidence did not apply to evidence of prior difficulties
between a defendant and his victim.' The supreme court rejected this
argument, noting that the inherent prejudice is the same.39 Therefore,
the trial court erred when it admitted the extrinsic act evidence without
complying with the Uniform Superior Court Rules.'
In a special concurrence, Justices Hunt, Hunstein, and Carley,
disagreed.4 1 Justice Carley first noted that the court's decisions
addressing evidence of defendant's prior difficulties with the victim
conflicted, and one line of authority or the other needed to be overruled.42 To Justice Carley, the need for procedural safeguards mandating prior notice of the prosecution's intent to use similar transaction
evidence is understandable; the defendant needs fair warning to rebut
this evidence.'
In the case of evidence of prior difficulty with the
victim, however, advance warning is not needed. Clearly, a defendant
will realize that the state will attempt to use evidence of his prior
altercations with the victim. Thus, Justice Carley concluded, the
procedural requirements of Uniform Superior Court Rules 31.1 and 31.3
should not be extended to evidence of this nature.'
The appellate courts have always been particularly tough on defendants in child molestation cases. This view is evidenced by the court of
appeals decision in Adams v. State.4 In Adams defendant, who was
convicted of child molestation and sodomy, contended that the trial court
erred when it admitted certified copies of his conviction for child
molestation in Indiana.' The State offered no evidence, other than the
documents, establishing the similarity of the prior offense to the charged
offense as required by Stephens.47 The court of appeals acknowledged

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 533, 436 S.E.2d at 481.
Id. at 534, 436 S.E.2d at 482.
Id.
263 Ga. at 536-39,436 S.E.2d at 483-85 (Hunt, Hunstein & Carley, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 537, 436 S.E.2d at 484.
Id. at 538, 436 S.E.2d at 484.
Id., 436 S.E.2d at 485; UNIFORM SUPERIOR COURT RULES 31.3, 31.3 (1993).
208 Ga. App. 29, 430 S.E.2d 35 (1993).
Id. at 29, 430 S.E.2d at 35.
Id. at 30, 430 S.E.2d at 37.
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the holding of Stephens.' The court of appeals also noted that special
allowances had been made in child molestation cases: "'[The sexual
molestation of young children, regardless of sex or type of act, is
sufficient similarity to make the evidence admissible.'"49 In candid
language describing numerous special rules for child molestation cases,
the court of appeals explained why special rules are necessary in child
molestation cases:
Of all the sex crimes imaginable, nowhere is a liberal extension of the
rule more necessary to facilitate the search for truth than in the sordid
area of sex crimes committed against children, particularly those of
tender age whose inability to speak for themselves makes them the
most vulnerable prey to the most dispiteous of criminal depredation.'
Accordingly, the court of appeals distinguished Stephens since the
prosecution had shown that the prior offense involved the sexual abuse
of a young child; the similarity requirement of Williams was therefore
satisfied.5 1
The dissenting opinion in Evans v. Stater2 raises a question addressed frequently in federal court, but to the author's knowledge, not
addressed before by Georgia appellate courts. In Evans the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's admission of evidence of a prior drug
transaction involving defendant.5 The majority reasoned that this
evidence was relevant to establish defendant's "guilty knowledge.""4 In
dissent Justices Beasley and Cooper noted that the charged offense, sale
of cocaine, required no specific intent.' According to the trial court,
the evidence of the prior transaction was admitted to establish motive,
bent of mind, intent to engage in the sale of cocaine, and course of
conduct.5 6 However, defendant did not testify at trial and did not
dispute that a drug sale took place. Rather, defendant contended that
he did not participate in the sale.5" Thus, the dissent concluded intent
and state of mind were not in issue; consequently, the similar transaction evidence was not sufficiently relevant to a legitimate issue to

48.
49.
S.E.2d
50.

Id. at 31, 430 S.E.2d at 38.
Id. at 32, 430 S.E.2d at 38 (quoting Phelps v. State, 158 Ga. App. 219, 220, 279
513, 514 (1981)).
Id.

51. Id. at 34, 430 S.E.2d at 40.
52. 209 Ga. App. 606, 434 S.E.2d 148 (1993).

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 607, 434 S.E.2d at 149.
Id.
209 Ga. App. at 608, 434 S.E.2d at 150 (Beasley & Cooper, JJ., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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outweigh any inherent prejudicial effect." The federal courts, incidentally, have consistently rejected this argument, holding that a plea of not
guilty generally makes an issue of intent and thus warrants the
introduction of extrinsic act evidence. 9
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Blackburn argued that the
need for similar transaction evidence in this relatively simple case did
not outweigh the prejudice of this type of evidence.'
In Justice
Blackburn's opinion, "[clonsidering the relative simplicity of the state's
case-in-chief and the absence of any articulable need for the evidence of
similar transactions, it appears that the state's sole purpose for
proffering this evidence was to achieve the impermissible implications
regarding the defendant's character."
Although courts still freely admit similar transaction evidence in
criminal cases, courts rarely allow the use of similar transaction
evidence in civil cases because most civil actions do not involve issues of
intent, motive, plan, or scheme. For example, in a tort case defendant's
negligence on a prior occasion is not probative of whether his conduct on
the occasion at issue fell below the standard of ordinary care. 2 When
a party's state of mind in a civil case is relevant, however, similar
transaction evidence is admissible. For example, in Holt v. Grinnell,"
to prove that defendant's conduct on the occasion at issue warranted the
imposition of punitive damages, plaintiff sought to use evidence that
defendant had previously been driving while under the influence of
alcohol."
The trial court denied defendant's motion in limine to
exclude this evidence, and the court of appeals granted defendant's
application for interlocutory appeal.' The court of appeals acknowledged the general rule that in negligence cases evidence of a defendant's
similar conduct on prior occasions is not admissible.6 Evidence of prior
conduct tends to prove the impermissible fact that defendant has a habit
or proclivity of being negligent.6 7 Evidence of prior driving while under

58. Id. at 608-09, 434 S.E.2d at 150.
59. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 38 MERCER L. REv. 1253, 1259-60 (1987);
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 40 MERCER L. REv. 1291, 1299 (1989); Marc T. Treadwell,
Evidence, 43 MERCER L. REv. 1773, 1175-76 (1992).
60. 209 Ga. App. at 609-12, 434 S.E.2d at 150-53 (Blackburn, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 612, 434 S.E.2d at 152.
62. Haskins v. Laus Corp., 198 Ga. App. 470, 402 S.E.2d 58 (1991).
63. 212 Ga. App. 520, 441 S.E.2d 874 (1994).
64. Id. at 521, 441 S.E.2d at 875.
65. Id. at 520-21, 441 S.E.2d at 874.
66. Id. at 521, 441 S.E.2d at 875.
67. Id.
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the influence of alcohol is admissible, however, to prove wilful misconduct on the part of a defendant.6
B. Relevancy of PriorSexual Behavior
In the last two Evidence surveys, the author noted the appellate
courts' willingness to allow defendants greater latitude to adduce
evidence relating to a victim's prior sexual activity notwithstanding
Georgia's broad Rape Shield Statute."9 In the present survey period,
the courts continued to wrestle with the sometimes conflicting goals of
protecting a victim's privacy and guaranteeing a defendant a fair trial.
In Logan v. State," defendant sought to introduce evidence that the
victim, a taxi-cab driver, agreed to have sex with him in exchange for
money,' The victim, according to defendant, admitted to relationships
with all the black men in the community and that she had children by
black men. 2 The victim also told defendant she did not want to
become pregnant any more, and he should not ejaculate inside her.73
Defendant testified that the victim became upset when he did ejaculate
inside her and became even more distraught when he gave her only
twenty dollars. Nevertheless, the victim gave him a card with her name
on it for "future reference." 74
The trial court excluded this testimony."s On appeal defendant
argued that the trial court improperly applied the new Rape Shield
Statute retroactively. 76 Prior to July 1, 1989, the Rape Shield Statute
provided that evidence of past sexual behavior would be admissible if the
prior behavior involved the defendant or the evidence supported the
inference that defendant could have reasonably believed the alleged
victim consented to sexual intercourse.77 The amended statute changed
or to and.7" The court of appeals rejected defendant's argument on the
ground that the amendment could be applied retroactively since it

68. Id. at 521-22, 441 S.E.2d at 875.
69. Treadwell, supra note 18, at 221; Treadwell, supra note 18, at 233-34; O.C.G.A.
§ 24-2-3 (1982 & Supp. 1994).
70. 212 Ga. App. 734, 442 S.E.2d 883 (1994).
71. Id. at 734, 442 S.E.2d at 885.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 735, 442 S.E.2d at 885.
76. Id. at 736, 442 S.E.2d at 886.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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involved the admission of evidence thus causing only a procedural
change in the law. 9
Although not admissible under the new statute because the prior
sexual behavior did not involve him, defendant argued that the evidence
was admissible under the exception created by Official Code of Georgia
Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 24-2-3(c)(2).'0 The exception prevents
the introduction of evidence of prior sexual activity if the court finds the
evidence "is so highly material that it will substantially support a
conclusion that the accused reasonably believed that the complaining
witness consented to the conduct complained of and that justice
mandates the admission of such evidence ....

..

The court of appeals

rejected defendant's contention that the victim's testimony fell within
this exception. 2
Judge Beasley, joined by Judge Pope, dissented.' Judge Beasley
argued that the testimony was admissible under both versions of the
Rape Shield Statute. 4 Regarding the new version, Judge Beasley
argued that the exception should be construed to include this evidence
as part of the res gestae.85 "In the context and environment in which
the alleged statements were made, what defendant testified the
prosecutrix said to him about her personal sexual life and the sexual
with other men of his race were relevant to
relationships she had had
86
his defense of consent."

The racial overtones of Logan are unstated, but they are obvious.
Clearly, Judge Beasley and Judge Pope were concerned about the
possibility of juror prejudice in the prosecution of a black man for raping
a white woman. 7 The victim's statements to defendant, if true, could
substantially ameliorate this prejudice but would do so at the expense
of the victim. The Georgia General Assembly, by enacting the Rape
Shield Statute, has made the judgment that such evidence is not
admissible no matter how compelling. For the Rape Shield Statute to
have any teeth, the exception created by O.C.G.A. section 24-2-3(c)(2)
must be narrowly construed. To hold, as Judge Beasley advocates, that

79. Id.
80. Id. at 737, 442 S.E.2d at 887.
81.

Id.; O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1994).

82. 212 Ga. App. at 737, 442 S.E.2d at 887.

83. 212 Ga. App. at 743-45, 442 S.E.2d at 889-92 (Beasley & Pope, JJ., dissenting).
84. Id. at 740-43, 442S.E.2d at 889-91.

85. Id.
86. Id. at 742, 442 S.E.2d at 890.
87. Id. at 740-45, 442 S.E.2d at 889-92.
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the Rape Shield Statute fails to supplant the res gestae doctrine could
render the statute meaningless88
By its terms, the Rape Shield Statute applies only to rape cases."
The appellate courts, however, have tried to apply the principles of the
statute to prosecutions for other sexual offenses.' ° The court of appeals
continued this trend during the present survey period. In Mobley v.
State," a prosecution for sodomy, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion in limine to preclude defendant from eliciting testimony
about the victim's prior sexual experiences." The trial court conceded
that the Rape Shield statutory procedures were not applicable, but it
granted the State's motion based upon general principles of relevancy.93
The court of appeals found no abuse of discretion."
C.

Evidence of CollateralSource Benefits
In Denton v. Con-Way Southern Express, Inc.,9" the supreme court
held unconstitutional the General Assembly's efforts to abolish the
collateral source rule." As discussed in previous surveys,9 7 the court
of appeals initially held that the admission of this evidence was harmful
error even though a verdict was rendered against the plaintiff on the
issue of liability." Concluding that the prejudicial effect of evidence
concerning collateral source benefits could prompt a jury to find against
a plaintiff, the courts refused to hold an error relating to damages is
harmless when a plaintiff loses on the issue of liability 99 In the
present survey period, the court of appeals continued its trend of backing
away from this position. In Dietz v. Becker,' the court of appeals
refused to overturn a verdict in favor of defendant because the trial court
possibly admitted evidence of collateral source benefits." 1 The court
of appeals reasoned that while the evidence might have led a jury to
return an inadequate verdict for the plaintiffs, the evidence could not

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

212 Ga. App. at 74243, 442 S.E.2d at 890 (Beasley & Pope, JJ., dissenting).
Id.
See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 41 MERCER L. REV. 175, 186 (1989).
212 Ga. App. 293, 441 S.E.2d 780 (1994).
Id. at 294, 441 S.E.2d at 781.
Id.
Id. at 295,-441 S.E.2d at 782.
261 Ga. 41, 402 S.E.2d 269 (1991).
Id. at 41-42, 402 S.E.2d at 260-70.
Treadwell, supra note 18, at 214-15; Treadwell, supra note 18, at 236.
Id.
Id.
209 Ga. App. 678, 434 S.E.2d 103 (1993).
Id. at 680, 434 S.E.2d at 105.
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lead a jury to conclude that the plaintiffs were entitled to no recovery at
all. 2 Therefore, "the verdict for defendants in this case did not result
from the erroneous admission of this collateral source evidence." 3
In Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1324 v. Roberts,' the supreme court granted certiorari to address the issue of whether the
collateral source rule applies in contract cases." 5 The court of appeals
had held no distinction between tort and contract cases exists with
After
regard to the admissibility of collateral source elements."°
exploring the policy underlying the collateral source rule, the supreme
court reversed.0 7 The court reasoned that tort law inherently involves
a punitive factor. 08 While the victim is to be compensated, punishing
While the
the defendant for his wrongdoing is also important.'
application of the collateral source rule may result in a windfall or
double recovery for the plaintiff, this is preferable over allowing the
defendant to benefit from the fortuitous fact that a third party paid the
plaintiff's expenses. On the other hand, in contract cases no societal
interest that a defendant be punished exists. Damages in a breach of
contract case are intended solely to compensate for the injury sustained. 10 Thus, the court distinguished between tort and contract
cases:
The collateral source rule is applicable in tort cases because collateral
source evidence cannot be admitted to diminish the defendant's liability
for the actual harm that was caused by his tort. However, the
collateral source rule is not applicable in contract cases because
collateral source evidence can be admitted if it is relevant to demonstrate the
extent of the plaintiff's actual loss that was caused by the
1
breach.' '
In contract cases, the admissibility of collateral source evidence,
therefore, depends on its relevance in demonstrating the extent of
plaintiff's actual loss.

102. Id.
103. Id. (citing Wilhelm v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 190 Ga. App. 869, 380 S.E.2d 276
(1989)).
104. 263 Ga. 405, 434 S.E.2d 450 (1993).
105. Id. at 405, 434 S.E.2d at 450.
106. Roberts v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 205 Ga. App. 594, 595, 423 S.E.2d 16, 17

(1992),
107.
108.
109.
110.

reu'd, 263 Ga. 405, 434 S.E.2d 450 (1993).
263 Ga. at 412, 434 S.E.2d at 455.
Id. at 408, 434 S.E.2d at 452.
Id.
Id.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
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Finally, the court of appeals reaffirmed that a plaintiff may open the
door to the admission of collateral source evidence.112 For example, if
a plaintiff suggests that he does not have insurance, or that his expenses
caused him financial worries but in reality his expenses were reimbursed
by insurance, collateral source evidence may be admitted."n
D. Evidence of Settlement Discussions
The principle that "admissions or propositions made with a view to a
compromise are not proper evidence" 4 is most likely known to any
trial lawyer who has attempted to negotiate a settlement. However,
evidence of settlement discussions can be powerful evidence for a
plaintiff because, as a practical matter, jurors view an offer to settle a
claim as an admission of liability. Thus, plaintiffs frequently argue that
a defendant's statement is an admission rather than an offer to compromise.
The court of appeals addressed this issue in Houston v. Kinder-Care
Learning Centers, Inc.," 5 a case in which plaintiffs sought damages for
the alleged abuse of their child. 1 Prior to filing suit, plaintiffs met
with defendant's representatives. At one of these meetings, a representative asked, "What is it going to take to make you folks happy?"" 7
The trial court granted defendant's motion in limine to exclude this
statement from evidence. 1 On appeal, plaintiff argued that the court
improperly restricted the use of this evidence."1 9 The court of appeals
noted that Georgia law makes a distinction between an offer to
compromise a disputed claim and an offer to settle an undisputed
claim. 120 The evidence clearly demonstrated that defendant disputed
the claim, and the offer of settlement, if it was that, was an offer to
compromise a claim in dispute.' 21 Therefore, the trial court properly
granted defendant's motion in limine.22
For years trial courts have struggled, for no good reason, with the
question of what to do when one joint tortfeasor settles with a plaintiff

112. Id.
113.

Moore v. Mellars, 208 Ga. App. 69,430 S.E.2d 179 (1993); Dietz v. Becker, 209 Ga.

App. 678, 434 S.E.2d 103 (1993).
114. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-37 (1982).
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

208 Ga. App. 235, 430 S.E.2d 24 (1993).
Id. at 237, 430 S.E.2d at 26.
Id.
Id. at 238-39, 430 S.E.2d at 27.
Id. at 238, 430 S.E.2d at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id.

1994]

EVIDENCE

245

and the claim against the other joint tortfeasor proceeds to a trial. The
seemingly obvious answer is to simply reduce any verdict in plaintiff's
favor by the amount of the settlement. The jury need never be informed
of the settlement. Trial courts continue to mishandle this issue,
however, and the court of appeals has once again held that reducing the
verdict is the preferable way of resolving this issue. 23
Miscellaneous
In Blige v. State,'24 the supreme court granted certiorari to the court
of appeals to answer the following question:

E.

When an expert is hired by a party, not called by that party, but called
by the opposing party in a criminal proceeding, is testimony as to the
expert's original employment pertinent to the issues in a criminal
prosecution or should such testimony be ruled inadmissible because it
is irrelevant, prejudicial and harmful as has been ruled in civil
condemnation cases?"z
The supreme court concluded that the fact that defendant hired the
expert was irrelevant. 126 The court reasoned that the issue was
as to who
whether defendant committed the offense, and testimony
127
employed an expert would not be probative of this issue.

III. PRIVILEGES
The court of appeals decision in White v. State1 21 provides an
informative and rather crude discussion of various issues involving the
marital privilege.' 29 In White defendant, who was convicted of rape,
aggravated sodomy, and child molestation, called his wife as a witness.' 0 The State then vigorously cross-examined the wife, eliciting
testimony that she and defendant engaged in consensual anal intercourse on a regular basis.' 3' On appeal defendant first contended that
the cross-examination of his wife violated her right not to testify against
him.'3 2 The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the wife waived

123.
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125.
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128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Allison v. Patel, 211 Ga. App. 376, 438 S.E.2d 920 (1993).
264 Ga. 166, 441 S.E.2d 752 (1994).
Id. at 166, 441 S.E.2d at 752-53.
Id. at 166-67, 441 S.E.2d at 753.
Id.
211 Ga. App. 694, 440 S.E.2d 68 (1994), cert. granted, (Ga. Apr. 1, 1994).
Id. at 695, 440 S.E.2d at 70.
Id.
Id. at 695-96, 440 S.E.2d at 70.
Id. at 695, 440 S.E.2d at 70; O.C.G.A. § 24-9-23 (1982 & Supp. 1994).

246

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

her privilege when she voluntarily testified. 33 Next, defendant argued
that the cross-examination of his wife violated his right to keep marital
The court agreed that this marital
communications confidential.'
privilege generally applied to all communications between married
persons if the communication was made in reliance upon the confidential
relation of husband and wife. 3 5 Communication includes acts performed by a spouse in contemplation of the marital relationship.3
The privilege does not include "impersonal communications or actions
performed without regard for the special confidence between spouses in
the marital relation.1 3 7
The court of appeals noted its decision in Brown v. State,1 8 discussed in a previous survey,3 in which it held an act of theft performed in a wife's presence was not a confidential communication within
the scope of themarital privilege. "0 In White the court distinguished
Brown on the grounds that a theft could have been committed in the
wife's absence.'" Further, the court of appeals noted, in an apparent
attempt to discredit Brown, that the majority opinion in Brown was only
a physical precedent.'4 2 In any event, the pertinent act in White
clearly was performed in contemplation and in reliance upon the
confidential marital relationship. 4 3 Therefore, the court of appeals
held that the trial court improperly allowed the State to cross examine
defendant's wife about their sexual activity.'" Moreover, defendant
did not waive the privilege when he called his wife as a witness because
defendant's examination of his wife did not address privileged matters."4 Thus, the court of appeals reversed defendant's conviction. 46

133. 211 Ga. App. at 695, 440 S.E.2d at 70.
134. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 24-9-21 (1982).
135. 211 Ga. App. at 695, 440 S.E.2d at 70 (citing McCord v. McCord, 140 Ga. 170, 78
S.E. 833 (1913); Georgia Intl Life Ins. Co. v. Boney, 139 Ga. App. 575, 228 S.E.2d 731
(1976)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 696, 440 S.E.2d at 70.
138. 199 Ga. App. 188, 404 S.E.2d 469 (1991).
139. Treadwell, supra note 18, at 226.
140. 211 Ga. App. at 696, 440 S.E.2d at 70 (citing Brown, 199 Ga. App. at 190, 404
S.E.2d at 471-72).
141. Id.
142. Id., 440 S.E.2d at 70-72.
143. Id.
144. Id., 440 S.E.2d at 71.
145. Id. at 696-97, 440 S.E.2d at 71.
146. Id. at 697, 440 S.E.2d at 71.
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IV. WrNESSES

Impeachment by Evidence of Character
As discussed above, extrinsic act evidence is generally inadmissible
when offered for substantive purposes. Such evidence also is generally
inadmissible to impeach or bolster witnesses. 47 This principle,
however, is subject to many exceptions. For example, Georgia law
permits the use of general bad character evidence to impeach a witness
other than a criminal defendant.'" Even criminal defendants who
open the door to general bad character evidence can be impeached with
evidence of specific instances of misconduct. 4 Prior to the supreme
court decision in Jones v. State,'50 an adroit prosecutor could easily
place defendants in an impeachment situation when the defendants
opened the door to general bad character evidence. For example, before
Jones a defendant testifying about his good conduct placed his character
in issue if he did not acknowledge all his prior bad conduct. Thus, a
defendant testifying under vigorous cross-examination that he would not
commit a particular act because he was not that type of person subjected
himself to impeachment with evidence of his criminal record. Jones
ended this practice.' 5 ' In the present survey period, the court of
appeals forcefully reaffirmed Jones in Hancock u. State. 52
The conduct complained of in Busbee v. State5 is difficult to
categorize because it was egregious and distant from any possible
permissible purpose. In one fell swoop, the prosecution violated
principles governing the use of similar transaction evidence, character
evidence, general principles of relevancy, and proper methods of
impeachment. 5 4 In Busbee defendant was convicted of the theft of a
$175 saw."' The saw's owner found the missing saw in defendant's
At the time of this discovery, defendant was talking with
car. 5'
Walter Ellis.'57 Defendant maintained that she found the saw in her car

A.
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Jones v. State, 257 Ga. 753, 363 S.E.2d 529 (1988).
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84 (1982).
Bland v. State, 198 Ga. App. 671, 402 S.E.2d 782 (1991).
257 Ga. 753, 363 S.E.2d 529 (1988).
257 Ga. at 758, 363 S.E.2d at 534.
210 Ga. App. 528, 437 S.E.2d 610 (1993).
210 Ga. App. 17, 435 S.E.2d 60 (1993).
Id. at 18, 435 S.E.2d at 60-61.
Id. at 17, 435 S.E.2d at 60.
Id.
Id.
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and was attempting to return it when she stopped to talk with Ellis. 5 '
At trial the State asked defendant if she knew that Ellis had previously
been indicted on federal charges "'for running a stolen automobile
ring.'"'59 The trial court overruled defendant's motion for a new
trial.'" In closing, the State argued that defendant intended to sell the
saw to a "fence," presumably Ellis.'
The court of appeals reversed
defendant's conviction, holding that the question relating to Ellis' prior
indictment was unsupported by any evidence, and thus would not be a
proper method to impeach character even if the defendant's character
was in issue.6 The court of appeals further held that the question
improperly impugned defendant's character and was not relevant to
prove her belief or intent because no evidence existed that defendant
knew Ellis had been accused of theft.'
B.

Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction
Currently, Georgia law governing the use of convictions to impeach a
witness creates a near hopeless state of confusion. No doubt this
confusion is partly due to the remarkable fact that the Georgia Evidence
Code fails to address the use of convictions for impeachment purposes.
Thus, no clear and concise framework exists to provide answers to the
issues that may arise when a party attempts to use a conviction to
impeach a witness. Accordingly, many appeals alleging the improper
use of convictions as impeachment evidence faced courts during this
survey period.
Georgia common law permits the use of a felony conviction or other
crime involving moral turpitude when impeaching a witness' general
character." 4 Appellate courts often must determine whether a particular misdemeanor conviction involves a crime of moral turpitude. In
O'Neal v. Kammin, 65 the supreme court held that a misdemeanor
conviction for possession of marijuana is not a crime of moral turpitude.'66 In Daniel v. State,6 7 the court of appeals held that a misdemeanor conviction for obstruction of a law enforcement officer did not
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Id.
Id. at 18, 435 S.E.2d at 60.
Id., 435 S.E.2d at 61.
Id.
Id.
Id.
THOMAS F. GREEN, GEORGIA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 139 (3d ed. 1988).
263 Ga. 218, 430 S.E.2d 586 (1993).
Id.at 219, 430 S.E.2d at 587.
211 Ga. App. 455, 439 S.E.2d 720 (1993).
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constitute a crime of moral turpitude and thus was inadmissible to
impeach a witness' general character.'
Perhaps the most confusion arises when the conviction results from
a plea of nolo contendere or a plea under the First Offender Act.'69 As
discussed in a previous survey, 7 ' the supreme court provided some
guidance in Witcher v. Pender,'7' holding First Offender Act convictions admissible to impeach the general character of a witness.'72 The
supreme court, however, noted that this holding did not affect the
principle that a first offender's record may be used in a civil case to
disprove or contradict a witness' testimony but not to impeach his
character generally. 7 ' During the present survey period, the court of
appeals revisited this issue.
In Jones v. State, 7 4 the State of Georgia sought to condemn a pickup
truck allegedly used by defendant in a gambling operation.'75 Previously, defendant pled guilty under the First Offender Act to a charge of
commercial gambling. 7 " At the condemnation trial, the trial court
admitted evidence of defendant's first offender guilty plea.' 77 Relying
on Witcher,178 the court of appeals held this conviction inadmissible. "79
' Judge Beasley, in dissent, agreed that a first offender conviction is inadmissible when impeaching a witness' general character
through proof of a previous conviction of a felony or a crime of moral
turpitude. 0 Judge Beasley noted, however, that a first offender plea is
admissible in a subsequent civil case when disproving or contradicting
specific testimony.'8 ' Judge Beasley argued that the State did not use
the First Offender Act conviction to prove conviction of a crime but
rather as an admission that defendant committed the crime. 8 ' The
majority responded that the conviction in this case was not offered to
disprove a witness' specific testimony and thus to prevent the jury from
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Id. at 456, 439 S.E.2d at 721.
O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60 to -65 (1991).
Treadwell, supra note 18, at 270.
260 Ga. 248, 392 S.E.2d 6 (1990).
Id. at 249, 392 S.E.2d at 8.
Id.
212 Ga. App. 682, 442 S.E.2d 880 (1994).
Id. at 682, 442 S.E.2d at 881.
Id. at 683, 442 S.E.2d at 881.
Id.
260 Ga. 248, 392 S.E.2d at 6.
212 Ga. App. at 683, 442 S.E.2d at 881.
212 Ga. App. at 685, 442 S.E.2d at 882 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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hearing obviously untrue testimony.'
Rather, the State used the
conviction in its case to establish that defendant committed the
crime.' Although the conviction was not used to impeach defendant's
general character as in Witcher, the majority nevertheless concluded that
this situation was governed by Witcher.'85
Regarding nolo contendere pleas, the court of appeals reaffirmed that
a plea of nolo contendere cannot be used to impeach a defendant in a
criminal case, even when impeaching a defendant's specific testimony.'
In civil cases, the rules governing the use of nolo contendere
pleas are slightly more complex, although the court of appeals arguably
provided some clarification during this survey period. In the 1990
survey of Georgia evidence law,"" the author discussed the supreme
court decision in State v. Rocco.'
The court in Rocco, after holding
that a nolo contendere plea could not be used against a criminal
defendant for any purpose, cast some doubt on the admissibility of a nolo
contendere plea to impeach a witness' general credibility in a civil
case.'88 During the present survey period, in Bentley v. B.M.W.,
Inc.,' 9 the court of appeals held that a plea of nolo contendere could
be used in a civil case to impeach a defendant's specific testimony."' 1
V. OPINION EVIDENCE

A.

Expert Witnesses
Georgia law concerning whether the opinion of an expert may be based
on hearsay is somewhat muddled. Numerous decisions hold that an
expert's opinion can be based only on facts within the personal knowledge of the expert or on hypothetical facts that are a part of the record.
A strong line of authority exists, however, holding that experts may base
their opinions upon hearsay. Perhaps most notable among these
decisions is the supreme court decision in King v. Browning,19 2 frequently cited for the proposition that an expert's testimony may be based
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Id. at 684, 442 S.E.2d at 882.
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Waters v. State, 210 Ga. App. 305, 436 S.E.2d 44 (1993).
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 42 MERCER L. REV. 223, 24244 (1990).
259 Ga. 463, 384 S.E.2d 183 (1989).
Id. at 466-67, 384 S.E.2d at 185.
209 Ga. App. 526, 433 S.E.2d 719 (1993).
Id. at 529, 433 S.E.2d at 722.
246 Ga. 46, 268 S.E.2d 653 (1980).
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on hearsay.' 3 The court of appeals decision in Loper v. Drury'"
arguably appears to signal a retreat from any liberalization of the
principles governing the factual basis for expert testimony.
In Drury the hearsay evidence at issue was admittedly suspect.""
Plaintiffs sought to elicit testimony that an intersection designed by one
of the defendants was unreasonably dangerous.'" This testimony was
based in part upon a letter from a police officer stating that a certain
number of accidents involving left hand turns had previously occurred
at the intersection.19 7 When the officer was deposed during a break in
the trial, however, she could not recreate the factual basis for the
letter.9"
The trial court consequently refused to allow plaintiffs'
expert to testify as to the contents of the letter.'"
On appeal plaintiffs contended that even if the letter was inadmissible, their expert could base his opinion upon the contents of the
letter."' Plaintiffs specifically relied upon King v. Browning.2"' In
a reading of King which can charitably be described as extremely
narrow, the court of appeals concluded that even King requires an expert
opinion based on hearsay to be proved by other witnesses. 2 2 The court
of appeals conceded narrow exceptions exist to the general rule on when
an expert can base his testimony on hearsay.' 3 Accordingly, the court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's exclusion of plaintiffs' expert
testimony.2°4
Davis v. State2 5 represents another example of the court of appeals
restrictive view of experts and their testimony.2 06 In Davis the
prosecution unnecessarily and unwisely asked the court to accept a
police officer as an expert in narcotics investigation. 7 When the

193. See, e.g., Martin v. Reed, 200 Ga. App. 775, 777, 409 S.E.2d 874, 877 (1991)
(Beasley, J., dissenting).
194. 211 Ga. App. 478, 440 S.E.2d 32 (1993).
195. Id. at 480, 440 S.E.2d at 34.
196. Id. at 479, 440 S.E.2d at 34.
197. Id., 440 S.E.2d at 33-34.
198. Id. at 480, 440 S.E.2d at 34.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 481-82, 440 S.E.2d at 35.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 482, 440 S.E.2d at 36. Of course, evidence proved by other witnesses is not
hearsay. Id
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 209 Ga. App. 572, 434 S.E.2d 132 (1993).
206. Id. at 572, 434 S.E.2d at 132.
207. Id. at 573, 434 S.E.2d at 134. There is no requirement under Georgia law that a
party obtain a court's ruling that a witness is qualified to testify as an expert. Id. at 574,
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prosecution made this motion, the witness had either not been sufficiently qualified or the purpose for his expert testimony was not clear; in any
event, the trial court sustained defendant's objection. 20 8 The trial
judge was subsequently satisfied that the officer was qualified to testify
as an expert and allowed testimony that the defendant possessed a
greater amount of drugs than a person would possess for personal
consumption.0 9 The court of appeals reversed. 10 The court of appeals held that the trial court's initial ruling, which the court of appeals
never explicitly changed or revoked, constituted a definitive rejection of
Even if the
the prosecution's tender of the officer as an expert.1
officer qualified as an expert in narcotics investigation, the court of
appeals ruled that he was not qualified as an expert on drug use.212
Therefore, he could not give opinion testimony on whether a quantity of
drugs was excessive for personal use.213
Judge Andrews and Judge Beasley dissented.214 They read the
record to mean that the trial court did not reject the officer's qualifications as an expert, but rather the relevance or need for expert testimony
had not been established at the time of tender.215 After additional
testimony, the relevance of the testimony became apparent and the trial
court's silence clearly indicated that the officer had been sufficiently
qualified as an expert.2 1 Because an express advance ruling that a
witness is an expert is unnecessary, the prosecution had no need to
obtain a ruling from the court that the officer was an expert. 217
B. Subject Matter of Expert Testimony
In virtually every suit arising from an automobile collision a police
officer completes a motor vehicle incident report. Typically, one side or
the other in the case wants the investigating officer's conclusions entered
434 S.E.2d at 134. Indeed, as pointed out in Davis, this may give improper credence to the

witness' testimony. Id. at 576, 434 S.E.2d at 135 n.1 (Andrews, J., dissenting). It is
incumbent upon the opposing party or the court on its own motion to raise the issue of
whether an expert is, in fact, an expert. Id. Undoubtedly, the prosecution in Davis was
attempting to lend credence to its expert when it asked the court to rule to this effect. The
ploy, of course, backfired. Id. at 574, 434 S.E.2d at 134.
208. 209 Ga. App. at 574, 434 S.E.2d at 134.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 575, 434 S.E.2d at 135.
211. Id. at 574, 434 S.E.2d at 134.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 209 Ga. App. at 572, 434 S.E.2d at 132 (Andrews & Beasley, JJ., dissenting).
215. Id. at 575, 434 S.E.2d at 135.
216. Id. at 576, 434 S.E.2d at 136.
217. Id.
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into evidence. This practice has led to a long line of conflicting and
confusing opinions about the admissibility of an investigating officer's
conclusions. The court of appeals revisited this issue during the present
survey period, in Vickery v. PPG Industries, Inc.,21 and left the field
in a state of confusion and conflict.
In Vickery the investigating officer testified that plaintiff "misjudged
clearance" and this was a "contributing factor" in the collision.2 19 On
appeal, plaintiff contended that this testimony amounted to an improper
opinion on the ultimate issue and thus invaded the province of the
jury.
In a one sentence discussion of the merits of the appeal, the
court of appeals held that the officer's explanation of "what actions he
took in filling out the incident report, after having heard appellants
admission that the latter had been 'too close' to the parked trailer, was
not opinion testimony on the ultimate issue of negligence ....

221

In

a concurring opinion, Judge Pope disputed the majority's conclusion that
the officer simply testified to the actions he took in completing his
report. 2 2 Instead, the officer expressed his opinion that plaintiff
misjudged the clearance and that this contributed to the collision.223
Judge Pope concluded that the opinion testimony invaded the province
of the jury. 4 Judge Pope agreed, however, that plaintiff failed to
properly preserve this issue for appeal. 25
VI.

HEARSAY

A.

ConstitutionalIssues
In criminal cases the use of hearsay evidence frequently raises the
issue of whether the evidence violates the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 26 Case law has
considerably modified the constitutional principles governing this conflict
over the past several years. The author has attempted to chronicle these
modifications in previous Georgia and Eleventh Circuit survey articles; 227 this detailed discussion will not be repeated here. Generally,
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courts have interpreted the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Ohio v. Roberts' to impose two constitutional limitations on the use
First, the prosecution
of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings.'
must demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant.' 0 Second, the
statement must bear adequate indicia of reliability. 1 The decision in
Roberts suggested, and the Supreme Court later confirmed, that the
requisite indicia of reliability could be found if the evidence fell within
a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 2 The unavailability requirement,
however, has been steadily eroded over the years, and in White v.
Illinois, 3 the Supreme Court limited the Roberts requirement of
unavailability to the facts of the case in Roberts.'
In two separate cases during the survey period, the court of appeals
strongly criticized a practice in Georgia which seems to run afoul of a
defendant's constitutional right to confront his witnesses. In Neal v.
State235 and Wade v. State,"' defendants contended that the trial
courts in their respective cases erred by allowing a police officer to
testify that eyewitnesses identified defendants during lineups. 7 In
both cases, the eyewitnesses did not testify at trial. 23 The court of
appeals agreed that this testimony appeared to be hearsay and that
defendants were deprived of their right to cross-examine the eyewitnesses.2 9 The court noted, however, that the Georgia Supreme Court, in
Haralson v. State," held that testimony of this nature is not inadmissible hearsay."' In Wade the court of appeals analyzed the underpinnings of Haralson and concluded that the case was simply wrongly
decided. 2 In Neal the court of appeals suggested that "[iUt may be
time, however, for the Supreme Court to reconsider Haralson or at least
limit its application to cases in which the identifying witness is available
The exception to the hearsay rule, if it can
for cross-examination."'

228. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
229. Id. at 66.
230. Id.

231. Id232.
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Id.; Bouijaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987).
502 U.S. 346 (1992).
Id. at 348.
211 Ga. App. 829, 440 S.E.2d 717 (1994).
208 Ga. App. 700, 431 S.E.2d 398 (1993).
211 Ga. App. at 830, 440 S.E.2d at 719; 208 Ga. App. at 700, 431 S.E.2d at 399.
211 Ga. App. at 829, 440 S.E.2d at 718; 208 Ga. App. at 700, 431 S.E.2d at 399.
211 Ga. App. at 830, 440 S.E.2d at 719; 208 Ga. App. at 700, 431 S.E.2d at 399.
234 Ga. 406, 216 S.E.2d 304 (1975).
Id. at 408, 216 S.E.2d at 304.
208 Ga. App. at 701, 431 S.E.2d at 400.
211 Ga. App. at 830, 440 S.E.2d at 719.
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be called that, does not seem to be a well recognized or firmly established exception that could pass muster under Ohio v. Roberts.
Judging from the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in McKissick v.
State,2" the court will not be particularly receptive to the court of
appeals plea. In McKissick the trial court permitted the boyfriend of
defendant's wife to testify concerning the wife's account to him of
previous difficulties with her husband.2' Defendant was charged with
the murder of his wife.2' Clearly, this testimony was hearsay. The
supreme court held, however, that the evidence was admissible pursuant
to O.C.G.A. section 24-3-1, which permits the use of hearsay evidence "in
specified cases from necessity." 247 The court reasoned that the testimony was clearly necessary based on the victim's death.2' The supreme
court further found that the circumstances under which the victim told
her boyfriend of these difficulties established that the victim's accounts
were trustworthy.2' The court did not specifically address the potential constitutional infirmities of this testimony. Certainly, difficulty
exists in determining whether this exception to the hearsay rule meets
the requirement of Roberts that hearsay testimony fit within a firmly
rooted exception to the hearsay rule.' s The supreme court reaffirmed
McKissick in Roper v. State,"5 ' a case involving facts virtually identical
to McKissick.
A majority of the court of appeals was not particularly concerned with
a defendant's constitutional rights in Jarrett v. State.252 In Jarrett

defendant contended that the trial court improperly permitted a police
officer to testify about comments made by a nontestifying witness in the
presence of defendant.' 53 The court of appeals disagreed, citing the
well-established principle that "a witness may testify as to what he saw
and heard while in the defendant's presence."' 4 As noted in a previous survey,' however, the supreme court seemingly
held in Faircloth
7
v. State'5 that such statements are hearsay.1
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263 Ga. 188, 429 S.E.2d 655 (1993).
Id. at 189, 429 S.E.2d at 656.
Id. at 188, 429 S.E.2d at 656.
Id. at 189, 429 S.E.2d at 657 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1(b) (1982)).
Id. (citing Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625, 409 S.E.2d 839 (1991)).
Id.
448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
263 Ga. 201, 429 S.E.2d 668 (1993).
212 Ga. App. 381, 441 S.E.2d 843 (1994), cert. granted.
Id. at 383, 441 S.E.2d at 845.
Id. (citing Reeves v. State, 194 Ga. App. 539, 540, 391 S.E.2d 35 (1990)).
Treadwell, supra note 18, at 254-55.
253 Ga. 67, 316 S.E.2d 457 (1984).
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In Jarrett four dissenting judges argued that Faircloth clearly
disapproved of admitting testimony of a declarant unavailable at
trial.2"
The majority, however, looked to the narrow holding of
Faircloth that the hearsay was "'cumulative'" of other evidence and
therefore its admission was harmless error."' This holding, the
majority reasoned, did not overturn the rule that a witness may testify
as to what he saw and heard in the presence of the accused.'
The
majority did not address the substantive discussion of the supreme court
in Faircloth.
B.

Child Hearsay Statute
26
In the eight years since the adoption of the Child Hearsay Statute, '
appellate courts have gradually interpreted the statute, with perhaps
some judicial legislation, to a point of easy application. Thus, fewer
appeals involve the application of the Child Hearsay Statute. Nevertheless, all the kinks have not yet been worked out of the statute. During
the present survey period, the court of appeals addressed two of these
kinks, resolving one.
Two years ago, the author discussed the court of appeals decision in
Rolader v. State.6 2 In Rolader the court of appeals noted a possible
constitutional infirmity in Georgia's Child Hearsay Statute.'
The
statute requires that the child be "available to testify in the proceedings." 264 In Rolader the court of appeals noted the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 5 that held the use of
hearsay evidence violates the confrontation clause if the declarant is
available to testify at trial.2 ' The Supreme Court reasoned that,
absent unavailability, no need for the use of the hearsay testimony
exists.267 Noting this direct conflict with the Georgia statute, the court
of appeals concluded that "to the extent that the Confrontation Clause
conditions the admissibility of such evidence on the child's unavailability

257. Treadwell, supra note 18, at 254-55.
258. 212 Ga. App. at 384, 441 S.E.2d at 846 (Pope, C.J., Cooper, Blackburn & Smith,
JJ., dissenting).
259. 212 Ga. App. at 384,441 S.E.2d at 846 (quoting Faircloth v. State, 253 Ga. 67,319
S.E.2d 457 (1984)).
260. 212 Ga. App. at 384, 441 S.E.2d at 846.
261. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (Supp. 1993).
262. 202 Ga. App. 134, 413 S.E.2d 752 (1991); Treadwell, supra note 25, at 238-40.
263. 202 Ga. App. at 140, 413 S.E.2d at 757.
264. O.C.G-A. § 24-3-16 (1982 & Supp. 1994).
265. 448 U.S. at 56, 66.

266. 202 Ga. App. at 140, 413 S.E.2d at 757.
267. Id. at 140, 413 S.E.2d at 757.
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to testify, it would appear that the requirements of our statute may
conflict with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment."'
The court
of appeals, however, dodged this issue by reversing the conviction in
Rolader on other grounds. 9 Unfortunately, the court in Rolader
failed to acknowledge that the blanket unavailability requirement,
assumed in Roberts, was no longer sacrosanct. In Idaho v. Wright,270
the United States Supreme Court held that "the general requirement of
unavailability did not apply to incriminating out-of-court statements
made by a non-testifying co-conspirator ....
Thus, not all exceptions to the hearsay rule require a demonstration of unavailability.
During the present survey period, the court of appeals had an
opportunity, in Knight v. State, 2 to embrace the reasoning of Idaho
v. Wright, but it failed to do so. Defendant in Knight, relying upon
Rolader, argued that the admission of a child's out-of-court statement
violated his due process rights under the United States and Georgia
Constitutions because the child was available to testify.273 The court
of appeals summarily dismissed this argument, noting that defendant
misunderstood the constitutional requirement of "necessity."274 The
court of appeals reasoned that the "rule of necessity may be satisfied not
only by showing that the declarant is not available for trial, but
alternatively by producing the declarant at trial available to testify." 75
"
In Riddle v. State,275 the court of appeals provided more definitive
guidance. The court held that statements made by the victim about
sexual contact between defendant and another child are inadmissible
under the Child Hearsay Statute.277 Rather, the statute only provides
a vehicle for the admission of statements concerning acts of sexual
conduct or physical abuse performed on the child making the statements.2 78

268. Id.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 141, 413 S.E.2d at 758.
497 U.S. 805 (1990).
Id. at 815 (citing United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394-400 (1986)).
210 Ga. App. 228, 435 S.E.2d 682 (1993).
Id. at 230, 435 S.E.2d at 684.

274. Id.
275. Id., 435 S.E.2d at 685; see also Tucker v. State, 208 Ga. App. 441, 430 S.E.2d 811
(1993) (discussion by the court of appeals of the constitutional issues raised by the Child

Hearsay Statute).
276. 208 Ga. App. 8, 430 S.E.2d 153 (1993).
277. Id. at 11, 430 S.E.2d at 156.
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C. Value
Georgia law carves out a special rule for opinion evidence of the value
of an object. This rule is demonstrated by the court of appeals decision

in Truck Parts & Service, Inc. v. Rutledge."79 In Rutledge defendant

contended that plaintiff improperly testified concerning the value of a
damaged building because his testimony was based upon hearsay.'
On direct examination, plaintiff testified in some detail about his
estimate of the building's value."' On cross-examination, however, he
admitted obtaining his testimony from someone else experienced in the
construction industry. 2 Plaintiff conceded that his testimony was
"just somebody else's opinion."'
Plaintiff even admitted that no
factual basis for his testimony existed. 4 On redirect examination,
defendant maintained that he had no independent facts to support his
claims, and that his testimony of the building's value was based on
estimates that he had been given.'
The court of appeals affirmed,
noting that testimony on value may be based entirely on hearsay, thus
affecting the weight of such testimony but not its admissibility,'
VII.

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

In Summerour v. State,287 the trial court permitted a deputy to
testify about the contents of a letter allegedly written by defendant.'
In this letter, addressed to a co-defendant, defendant offered to pay the
co-defendant money if he would admit his involvement in the charged
offense."
The co-defendant showed the letter to the deputy but
subsequently destroyed it.'
Defendant contended that the State did
not adequately authenticate the letter based on its failure to prove that
defendant was the author. 1 The deputy testified, however, that he
was familiar with defendant's handwriting and that the handwriting in

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

211 Ga. App. 166, 438 S.E.2d 404 (1993).
Id. at 167, 438 S.E.2d at 405.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 168, 438 S.E.2d at 406.
211 Ga. App. 65, 438 S.E.2d 176 (1993).
Id. at 65, 438 S.E.2d at 177.
Id., 438 S.E.2d at 178.
Id. at 66, 438 S.E.2d at 178.
Id. at 65, 438 S.E.2d at 177.
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the letter was the defendant's.'
O.C.G.A. section 24-7-6 permits a
witness to identify the handwriting of a particular person through
testimony. 3 The jury determines the weight of testimony regarding
handwriting.2"
Because the deputy testified to several peculiar features of defendant's
handwriting and these features were present in the letter which he read,
the court held that the letter had been sufficiently authenticated. 5
Further, the court of appeals rejected defendant's argument that the
deputy's testimony violated the Best Evidence Rule. 296 The court
acknowledged that generally an original of a writing must be introduced
when a party seeks to establish the contents of the writing.297 Other
evidence of the writing may, however, be admitted when the original is
unavailable. 8 Thus, if the document is lost or destroyed, secondary
evidence of the contents of the document is admissible.'
In Summerour the co-defendant testified that he threw the letter away after
showing it to the deputy.3w The court of appeals held that destruction
of the letter constituted a sufficient explanation for the absence of the
original document and thus the deputy's parol evidence of the contents
was admissible."' 1
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Id. at 66, 438 S.E.2d at 177.

294.
295.
296.
297.
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